

Lecture Notes

Livdan, Sapriza, and Zhang (2009, Journal of Finance):
Financially Constrained Stock Returns

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BUSFIN 8250: Advanced Asset Pricing
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Theme

A dynamic investment-based asset pricing model with debt dynamics in the form of collateral constraints

Outline

1 Economic Question

2 Model

3 Qualitative Analysis

4 Quantitative Results

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Economic Question

In search for a deep integration between investment-based asset pricing and (dynamic) corporate finance

Specifically, how financial constraints affect risk and expected returns?

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Model Technology

Operating profits for firm j with capital k_{jt} and fixed costs f :

$$\pi(k_{jt}, z_{jt}, x_t) = e^{x_t + z_{jt}} k_{jt}^\alpha - f$$

in which the aggregate productivity follows:

$$x_{t+1} = \bar{x}(1 - \rho_x) + \rho_x x_t + \sigma_x \epsilon_{t+1}^x$$

and the firm-specific productivity follows:

$$z_{jt+1} = \rho_z z_{jt} + \sigma_z \epsilon_{jt+1}^z$$

with all shocks independent of each other

Model

Stochastic discount factor, m_{t+1}

Specify the stochastic discount factor exogenously:

$$\begin{aligned}\log m_{t+1} &= \log \eta + \gamma_t(x_t - x_{t+1}) \\ \gamma_t &= \gamma_0 + \gamma_1(x_t - \bar{x})\end{aligned}$$

with $0 < \eta < 1, \gamma_0 > 0, \gamma_1 < 0$

Model

Investment costs

Capital accumulates according to:

$$k_{jt+1} = (1 - \delta)k_{jt} + i_{jt}$$

Total investment cost function:

$$\phi(i_{jt}, k_{jt}) \equiv i_{jt} + \begin{cases} \frac{a_P}{2} \left(\frac{i_{jt}}{k_{jt}} \right)^2 k_{jt} & \text{for } i_{jt} \geq 0 \\ \frac{a_N}{2} \left(\frac{i_{jt}}{k_{jt}} \right)^2 k_{jt} & \text{for } i_{jt} < 0 \end{cases}$$

with $a_N > a_P > 0$

Model

Collateral constraints

Let b_{jt+1} be the face value of one-period debt at the beginning of period t with payment due at the beginning of $t + 1$

Collateral constraint:

$$b_{jt+1} \geq s_0(1 - \delta)k_{jt+1}$$

in which $0 < s_0 < 1$

An alternative formulation with countercyclical liquidation costs:

$$b_{jt+1} \geq s_0 e^{(x_t - \bar{x})s_1}(1 - \delta)k_{jt+1}$$

with $s_1 > 0$

Model

Retained earnings

The saving rate is strictly less than the borrowing rate:

$$r_{st} = r_{ft} - \kappa$$

with $\kappa > 0$

The interest rate applicable to firm j :

$$\iota_{jt} \equiv \begin{cases} r_{ft} & \text{for } b_{jt+1} \geq 0 \\ r_{st} & \text{for } b_{jt+1} < 0 \end{cases}$$

Model

Costly external equity

New equity:

$$e_{jt} \equiv \max \left(0, \phi(i_{jt}, k_{jt}) + b_{jt} - \pi(k_{jt}, z_{jt}, x_t) - \frac{b_{jt+1}}{\iota_{jt}} \right)$$

Equity flotation costs:

$$\lambda(e_{jt}, k_{jt}) \equiv \begin{cases} \lambda_0 + \frac{\lambda_1}{2} \left(\frac{e_{jt}}{k_{jt}} \right)^2 k_{jt} & \text{for } e_{jt} > 0 \\ 0 & \text{for } e_{jt} \leq 0 \end{cases}$$

Also, countercyclical equity flotation costs ($\lambda_2 > 0$):

$$\lambda(e_{jt}, k_{jt}) \equiv \begin{cases} \lambda_0 + \frac{\lambda_1 e^{-(x_t - \bar{x})\lambda_2}}{2} \left(\frac{e_{jt}}{k_{jt}} \right)^2 k_{jt} & \text{for } e_{jt} > 0 \\ 0 & \text{for } e_{jt} \leq 0 \end{cases}$$

Model

The market value of equity

Net payout:

$$o_{jt} \equiv \pi(k_{jt}, z_{jt}, x_t) - \phi(i_{jt}, k_{jt}) + \frac{b_{jt+1}}{\iota_{jt}} - b_{jt} - \lambda(e_{jt}, k_{jt})$$

The market value of equity:

$$v(k_{jt}, b_{jt}, z_{jt}, x_t) = \max_{\{i_{jt}, b_{jt+1}\}} o_{jt} + E_t[m_{t+1} v(k_{jt+1}, b_{jt+1}, z_{jt+1}, x_{t+1})]$$

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Qualitative Analysis

Calibration

Parameter	Value	Description
α	0.65	Curvature in the production function
δ	0.01	Monthly rate of capital depreciation
ρ_x	$0.95^{1/3}$	Persistence coefficient of aggregate productivity
σ_x	0.007/3	Conditional volatility of aggregate productivity
η	0.994	Time-preference coefficient
γ_0	50	Constant price of risk parameter
γ_1	-1000	Time-varying price of risk parameter
a_P	15	Adjustment cost parameter when investment is positive
a_N	150	Adjustment cost parameter when investment is negative



Qualitative Analysis

Calibration

Parameter	Value	Description
ρ_z	0.96	Persistence coefficient of firm-specific productivity
σ_z	0.10	Conditional volatility of firm-specific productivity
f	0.015	Fixed costs of production
s_0	0.85	Liquidation value per unit of capital net of (acyclical) bankruptcy cost
s_1	0	Countercyclical liquidation cost parameter
λ_0	0.08	Fixed flotation cost parameter
λ_1	0.025	Convex (acyclical) flotation cost parameter
λ_2	0	Countercyclical flotation cost parameter
κ	0.50%/12	Monthly wedge between the borrowing and saving rates of interest



Qualitative Analysis

v_{jt}/k_{jt} conditional on $k_{jt} = \bar{k}$: $x_t = \bar{x}$ versus $z_{jt} = \bar{z}_j$





Qualitative Analysis

i_{jt}/k_{jt} conditional on $k_{jt} = \bar{k}$: $x_t = \bar{x}$ versus $z_{jt} = \bar{z}_j$





Qualitative Analysis

b_{jt+1}/k_{jt} conditional on $k_{jt} = \bar{k}$: $x_t = \bar{x}$ versus $z_{jt} = \bar{z}_j$





Qualitative Analysis

β_{jt} conditional on $b_{jt} = \bar{b}$: $x_t = \bar{x}$ versus $z_{jt} = \bar{z}_j$





Qualitative Analysis

β_{jt} conditional on $k_{jt} = \bar{k}$: $x_t = \bar{x}$ versus $z_{jt} = \bar{z}_j$





Qualitative Analysis

The shadow price of net debt, ν_{jt} , conditional on $k_{jt} = \bar{k}$:
 $x_t = \bar{x}$ versus $z_{jt} = \bar{z}_j$



Qualitative Analysis

The shadow price of net debt, ν_{jt} , conditional on $b_{jt} = \bar{b}$:
 $x_t = \bar{x}$ versus $z_{jt} = \bar{z}_j$



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Quantitative Results

Univariate sorts on the shadow price of new debt in simulations

Low	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	High	FC	t_{FC}
Panel A: Benchmark parametrization											
0.33	0.37	0.43	0.44	0.46	0.50	0.54	0.57	0.61	0.67	0.34	3.54
Panel B: High liquidation costs, $s_0 = 0.70$											
0.14	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.05	2.23
Panel C: Low equity flotation costs, $\lambda_0 = 0.02$											
0.37	0.40	0.45	0.50	0.52	0.53	0.58	0.61	0.62	0.62	0.25	4.63
Panel D: Countercyclical liquidation costs, $s_1 > 0$											
0.11	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.20	0.09	2.70
Panel E: Countercyclical equity flotation costs, $\lambda_2 > 0$											
0.34	0.40	0.44	0.49	0.53	0.60	0.63	0.70	0.75	0.79	0.45	4.53

Quantitative Results

Double sorts on the shadow price of new debt and market cap

		Benchmark $s_0 = 0.70 \lambda_0 = 0.02 s_1 > 0 \lambda_2 > 0$				LPS	WW
Low FC	SL	0.61	0.25	0.68	0.28	0.68	0.45 0.89
Middle FC	SM	0.64	0.31	0.75	0.34	0.84	0.67 0.66
High FC	SH	0.75	0.40	0.88	0.38	0.91	0.38 0.83
Low FC	ML	0.45	0.14	0.56	0.16	0.56	0.37 0.65
Middle FC	MM	0.50	0.16	0.60	0.21	0.74	0.56 0.81
High FC	MH	0.59	0.16	0.65	0.25	0.84	0.26 0.74
Low FC	BL	0.21	0.11	0.37	0.14	0.42	0.47 0.71
Middle FC	BM	0.30	0.08	0.41	0.15	0.51	0.53 0.96
High FC	BH	0.37	0.09	0.50	0.18	0.59	0.25 1.23
<i>HIGHFC</i>		0.51	0.22	0.63	0.26	0.74	0.30 0.93
<i>LOWFC</i>		0.39	0.06	0.51	0.16	0.67	0.43 0.75
FC		0.12	0.16	0.12	0.10	0.07	-0.13 0.18
t_{FC}		1.11	0.56	0.98	0.89	0.63	-1.17 0.95

Quantitative Results

Cross-sectional regressions in simulations

Benchmark			$s_0 = 0.70$		
ν_{jt}	$\ln(\text{ME})$	$\ln(\text{B/M})$	ν_{jt}	$\ln(\text{ME})$	$\ln(\text{B/M})$
1.69			1.17		
(3.47)			(2.10)		
2.52	-1.96	3.67	0.63	-3.01	2.03
(0.79)	(-2.55)	(3.07)	(1.59)	(-2.26)	(1.03)
$s_0 = 0.02$			$s_1 > 0$		
ν_{jt}	$\ln(\text{ME})$	$\ln(\text{B/M})$	ν_{jt}	$\ln(\text{ME})$	$\ln(\text{B/M})$
3.97			1.17		1.86
(2.12)			(2.65)		(3.07)
-1.96	-3.31	4.01	-0.76	-3.08	2.70
(-0.11)	(-4.72)	(3.07)	(-0.53)	(-2.46)	(2.62)
			ν_{jt}	$\ln(\text{ME})$	$\ln(\text{B/M})$

Quantitative Results

Cross-sectional determinants of the shadow price of new debt

The Whited and Wu (2006) variables							
<i>CF</i>		<i>TLTD</i>		<i>LNTA</i>			
Data	Benchmark	Data	Benchmark	Data	Benchmark		
-0.09	-0.25	0.02	0.14	-0.04	-0.11		
(-2.94)	(-10.24)	(1.91)	(4.59)	(-1.91)	(-10.53)		
<i>SG</i>		<i>D/VPOS</i>					
Data	Benchmark	Data	Benchmark				
-0.04	-0.02	-0.06	-0.37				
(-1.52)	(-5.88)	(-2.14)	(-3.67)				


Quantitative Results

Cross-sectional determinants of the shadow price of new debt

The Kaplan and Zingales (1997) variables							
		CF		TLTD		TDIV	
Data	Benchmark	Data	Benchmark	Data	Benchmark	Data	Benchmark
-1.00	-2.50	3.14	1.78	-39.37	-3.61		
(-4.28)	(-5.60)	(6.99)	(9.23)	(-6.46)	(-9.95)		
		CASH		Q			
Data	Benchmark	Data	Benchmark				
-1.32	-0.10	0.28	0.20				
(-4.55)	(-7.30)	(3.63)	(7.47)				

Quantitative Results

The leverage-expected return relation



Quantitative Results

Cross-sectional regressions of returns on
market leverage with and without asset beta

Panel A: Benchmark parametrization				
b_{jt}/v_{jt}	R^2	b_{jt}/v_{jt}	β_{jt}^A	R^2
1.093 (5.15)	0.28	1.051 (1.26)	0.0049 (3.31)	0.39
Panel B: High liquidation costs, $s_0 = 0.70$				
b_{jt}/v_{jt}	R^2	b_{jt}/v_{jt}	β_{jt}^A	R^2
3.617 (7.22)	0.14	2.456 (0.46)	0.0048 (10.29)	0.15
Panel C: Low fixed flotation costs, $\lambda_2 = 0.02$				
b_{jt}/v_{jt}	R^2	b_{jt}/v_{jt}	β_{jt}^A	R^2
3.490 (4.37)	0.09	3.083 (0.82)	0.0062 (10.40)	0.12

Conclusion

A dynamic investment-based asset pricing model a la Zhang (2005)
augmented with debt dynamics a la Hennessy and Whited (2005)